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REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE 3406TH MEETING, HELD ON 19 JULY 1994 (S/PRST/1994/35)

Letter of transmittal

Letter dated 29 August 1994 from the Security Council Mission established pursuant to the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 3406th meeting, held on 19 July 1994 (S/PRST/1994/35), addressed to the President of the Security Council

We, the members of the Security Council Mission established pursuant to the statement made by the President of the Security Council at the 3406th meeting, held on 19 July 1994 (S/PRST/1994/35), have the honour to submit to you herewith the report called for in item (g) of the terms of reference of the Mission set out in the Note by the President of the Security Council dated 4 August 1994 (S/1994/931).

(Signed)	Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG	(Brazil)
(Signed)	YANG Xiuping	(China)
(Signed)	Karel KOVANDA	(Czech Republic)
(Signed)	Roble OLHAYE	(Djibouti)
(Signed)	Patrick John RATA	(New Zealand)
(Signed)	Ibrahim A. GAMBARI (Chairman)	(Nigeria)
(Signed)	Salim Bin Mohammed AL-KHUSSAIBY	(Oman)
(Signed)	Vasiliy S. SIDOROV	(Russian Federation)
(Signed)	Karl F. INDERFURTH	(United States of America)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the 3406th meeting of the Security Council, held on 19 July 1994, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Mozambique", the President of the Security Council made the following statement (S/PRST/1994/35) on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council notes with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General of 7 July 1994 (S/1994/803) on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). It commends the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the personnel of ONUMOZ for their efforts in support of the implementation of the general peace agreement for Mozambique. They continue to have the full backing of the Council.

"The Security Council welcomes the significant progress made in the implementation of the general peace agreement, in particular in the electoral sphere, but remains concerned at continuing delays in the implementation of some major aspects of the agreement. The Council is especially concerned at the delays which continue to occur in the demobilization of forces and in the formation of the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). In this context, the Council reiterates its call in resolution 916 (1994) of 5 May 1994 to the parties to comply fully with all the provisions of the agreement.

"It is essential that the demobilization of all forces is completed by 15 August 1994, as agreed by the parties, and that the difficulties of forming, before the elections, FADM at the strength agreed in the general peace agreement are addressed quickly and with flexibility.

"The Council is encouraged by the recent announcement of the Mozambican Government's decision to turn over the assets, including equipment and facilities, of the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) to FADM by 15 August 1994 and reiterates the importance of the Government providing all necessary support to the establishment of FADM.

"The Council underlines the importance to the peace process of the rehabilitation of areas with a large returning population, including through an effective mine-clearance programme. In this regard, it urges that high priority be given to mine-clearance activities and related training.

"The Council, in its resolution 916 (1994), decided to renew the mandate of ONUMOZ for a final period until 15 November 1994 and welcomed the announcement by the President of the Republic of Mozambique that elections would take place on 27 and 28 October 1994. It reaffirms the importance it attaches to the elections taking place on these dates and stresses the need for additional decisive steps to that end. In this context, the Council stresses that there is no margin for further delay in demobilization and in the formation of FADM. The Council expects the parties to continue to cooperate with ONUMOZ and with each other to ensure full and timely implementation of the agreement.

"The Council reiterates the importance of the extension of civil administration throughout Mozambique, which is essential for the holding of free and fair elections. In this context, it reaffirms its call to all parties, especially the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), to allow unimpeded access to the areas under their control to all political forces in the country, in order to ensure free political activity throughout Mozambique.

"The Council expresses its intention to endorse the results of the elections provided the United Nations reports them as free and fair and reminds all the Mozambican parties of their obligation under the general peace agreement fully to respect the results.

"The Council will consider sending a mission, at an appropriate time, to Mozambique to discuss with the parties how best to ensure full and timely implementation of the general peace agreement and that the elections take place on the dates agreed and under the conditions set out in the agreement.

"The Council will continue to monitor developments in Mozambique closely and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that it is kept informed on a regular basis."

2. On 4 August 1994, the President of the Security Council issued the following note (S/1994/931):

"1. The President of the Security Council has the honour to refer to the statement made by the President of the Council at its 3406th meeting, held on 19 July 1994, in connection with the item entitled "The situation in Mozambique" (S/PRST/1994/35).

"2. The statement indicated, in particular, that the Security Council would consider sending a mission, at an appropriate time, to Mozambique to discuss with the parties how best to ensure full and timely implementation of the general peace agreement.

"3. In accordance with that decision, the President has held consultations with the members of the Council. Following those consultations, the members have agreed that the mission will depart for Mozambique on 6 August 1994, for a duration of approximately five days, and that it will be composed of the following nine members of the Council: Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Djibouti, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Russian Federation and United States of America.

"The mission will, inter alia:

"(a) Convey to the leaderships of the Government of Mozambique and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) the Security Council's concern at the delays in the implementation of major aspects of the general peace agreement for Mozambique;

"(b) Underline the necessity of completing the demobilization of all forces by 15 August 1994, as agreed by the parties;

"(c) Underline the need for the parties to ensure that the elections take place on the dates agreed and under the conditions set out in the agreement;

"(d) Stress the intention of the Council to endorse the results of the elections provided the United Nations reports them as free and fair;

"(e) Remind all the parties of their obligation under the general peace agreement fully to respect the results of the elections;

"(f) Stress the full support of the Security Council for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

"(g) Submit to the Council a report of the mission's findings during the visit."

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE MISSION

3. The Mission of the Security Council established pursuant to the statement made by the President on 19 July 1994 (S/PRST/1994/35) visited Mozambique from 7 to 12 August 1994, beginning its work in Mozambique on the morning of 8 August.

4. The Mission carried out its work in accordance with the terms of reference decided upon by the Security Council, as contained in the note by the President of the Council (S/1994/931).

5. The Mission's programme of work (see annex I) included meetings with Mr. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, President of the Republic of Mozambique and President of the Frente de Libertação Moçambique (FRELIMO), Mr. Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), Mr. Pascoal Manuel Mocumbi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mozambique, representatives of 16 other registered parties (see annex II), Mr. Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, senior staff of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), heads of government delegations to the peace commissions, the heads of RENAMO delegations to the peace commissions, the Chairman of the National Elections Commission, international members of the peace commissions and ambassadors of Security Council member countries (see annex III), ambassadors of African countries, the representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and representatives of the National Police Affairs Commission, the National Information Commission, the National Commission for Territorial Administration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

6. The Mission observed voter registration at a typical registration centre at Matalene. It visited the Training Centre of the New Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) at Manhica and the Mine-clearance Training Centre at Tete. It observed demobilization in RENAMO assembly areas in Nhamacala, at the government assembly

area at Chimoio and at General Staff Headquarters at Maputo, where it witnessed the demobilization of President Chissano and other high-ranking government officers. One member of the Mission visited assembly areas and ONUMOZ sections at Mocuba.

7. The Mission touched on all issues affecting the implementation of the general peace agreement, including demobilization, formation of the new army (FADM), issues relating to the elections, security problems in the country before, during and after the elections, humanitarian and refugee issues, mine clearance, the relationship between ONUMOZ and the Government and the role of ONUMOZ after the elections and beyond 15 November. The Mission also heard various requests for assistance.

III. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND

A. Demobilization

8. In accordance with its terms of reference, the Mission stressed to all interlocutors the necessity of completing the demobilization of all forces by 15 August 1994, as agreed by the parties.

9. The deadline for the demobilization of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM) was 15 August 1994. The process of the assembly of troops has concluded and demobilization is expected to be completed shortly.

10. After a number of serious riots and mutinies by soldiers kept for very long periods of time at assembly areas and unassembled locations, on the part of both the Government and RENAMO, owing to delays in the demobilization process, towards the end of July the Government and RENAMO allowed the soldiers themselves to choose between joining the new army and demobilization. The great majority of the soldiers chose demobilization and the reintegration support scheme financed by the Government and the international donor community, which is intended to facilitate their reintegration into normal civilian life. Under that plan, the soldiers receive six months of salary from the Government and 18 months subsidy at salary level from the fund established by the international donor community. The very high degree of demobilization has thus had a negative impact on the number of soldiers available for integration into the new army.

11. Very interestingly, however, a key opposition figure expressed the view that, after the elections, the current lack of sufficient recruits for the new army could be expected to correct itself. In his opinion, having exercised their option for demobilization, severance pay, and the 18-month subsidy at salary level, these ex-soldiers would still be free to return after elections and resume their military careers. This should, it is hoped, enable FADM to achieve at least the target of 15,000 troops relatively quickly.

12. As at 28 August 1994, a total of 70,086 soldiers (52,242 Government and 17,844 RENAMO) had been demobilized and 9,917 were in the process of being demobilized (7,662 on the Government side and 2,250 from RENAMO); 1,624 troops were still in the assembly area, pending resolution of questions relating to their documentation.

B. New army

13. Both President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama stressed the need to have an effective army in place, preferably by the time of the elections. The general peace agreement envisaged the formation of a 30,000-strong unified army before the elections, with 50 per cent of the personnel to be provided by the Government and 50 per cent by RENAMO. However, following delays in cantonment, assembly and demobilization, ONUMOZ proposed that the number of troops to be integrated into FADM before the elections be reduced to 15,000 (to the level covered by the existing training programmes), and to recruit the remainder later. While there was no formal agreement on this proposal, as a result of the riots and mutinies and the low number of FAM soldiers and RENAMO combatants choosing to join the new army, both parties are now prepared to move forward to the elections with whatever the number might be and to deal with the recruitment of the remainder thereafter. As at 28 August 1994, 7,398 had joined the new army. Of this figure, approximately 6,482 soldiers have already been or are being trained.

14. As announced by President Chissano at the 12 August 1994 ceremony for his demobilization as Commander-in-Chief, and that of other senior officers of FAM, a public ceremony was held on 16 August 1994 for the termination of FAM. In accordance with the general peace agreement, all authority, equipment and structures of FAM were to be transferred to FADM.

15. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force is responsible for the formation of FADM until the new Government takes office, after which FADM is to be placed under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. The responsibilities of the existing Ministry of Defence until the new Government takes office will have to be clarified.

16. The new army, FADM, lacks necessary funds and equipment, and will not be operational unless these are provided. The Mission was informed that the equipment of the old army was in the process of being transferred to the new army but that a large proportion of it is in poor condition. The weapons of the demobilizing soldiers and combatants were being collected. Some arms caches have been discovered. FADM needs additional equipment and infrastructure.

17. An area of concern is the training capability for the new army following the reduction in the strength of ONUMOZ. The assistance of the international community in building the new army has been requested by both the Government and RENAMO.

18. It was also pointed out that the army could be called upon to play a role in the regional security arrangements currently being discussed and that it would be desirable for it to be trained also for peace-keeping purposes.

19. The Mission has been informed that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General witnessed the demobilization of Mr. Dhlakama at a RENAMO demobilization ceremony held at Meringue on 19 August 1994.

C. Registration

20. The Mission was informed that there are an estimated 7.8 million eligible voters in Mozambique, of whom 6.1 million had been registered as at 20 August 1994. But many refugees have not yet returned.

21. The Mission was also informed that, until recently, there had been a limited number of registration brigades and a lack of free movement in the RENAMO-controlled areas because of their slow integration into the civil administration and the existence of land-mines. RENAMO stressed the need to ensure that as many eligible voters as possible are registered.

22. The deadline for registration for all persons was initially extended by five days to 20 August 1994, originally the deadline for special cases only. Under the Electoral Law, extension of the registration period by the competent authorities could not go beyond 12 September 1994, when the election campaign was to have begun. However, by the calculations of the National Elections Commission, the registration period could be extended by no more than five days in order to allow for the conduct of procedures concerning the publication of the results of the census and any challenges thereto. Subsequently, the Mission was informed that, on 23 August 1994, the National Assembly decided to extend the registration period until 2 September 1994.

23. The National Elections Commission decided to intensify the registration process, utilizing existing means. It is, however, experiencing logistical problems, including communications and transportation difficulties. Quick means of transportation, including helicopters, are needed to reach all parts of the country. In a country with a scattered population, there are only two daily newspapers with less than 15,000 copies circulating in two cities, and only two radio stations. The Mission was informed that approximately 5 million persons were expected to vote.

24. The Mission was informed that there was no province or district where registration had not begun but that registration had commenced late in RENAMO-controlled zones.

25. The Mission heard concerns expressed in several quarters about alleged registration irregularities and the fear of election irregularities. Not only must the elections be declared by the United Nations to have been free and fair, they must also be perceived as having been free and fair.

D. Elections

26. In accordance with its terms of reference, the Mission stressed to all interlocutors the need for the parties to ensure that the elections take place on the dates agreed and under the conditions set out in the agreement. The Mission reminded the parties of their obligation under the general peace agreement to respect fully the results of the elections, and stressed the intention of the Security Council to endorse the results of the elections provided the United Nations declared them free and fair.

27. President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama indicated their commitment to holding the elections on 27 and 28 October 1994, as scheduled.

28. The Mission obtained the assurances of the parties of their commitment to the peace process, to the election dates, and to accepting the results of the elections if they are declared free and fair. Mr. Dhlakama stated that the most important thing for RENAMO was the fulfilment of the democratic process and for all parties to make an effort to see that the result was a happy one.

29. Inasmuch as there is the political will to transcend problems, it is the view of the Mission that the elections will be held and the results respected.

30. The difficulties encountered in connection with the elections must be solved. Free access by all the parties to all areas in accordance with the general peace agreement will be necessary so that the elections may be held under acceptable conditions. Concern was raised in several quarters regarding lack of access to areas under RENAMO control for election purposes.

31. Some members of the international community strongly recommend that some form of political accommodation be agreed upon before the elections. Others believe that what is required is a political understanding between the leading parties to the effect that the democratic rules will continue to be observed after the elections are held. It was pointed out that the Government does not support the idea of a Government of national unity. However, it did not rule out the inclusion in the Government of personalities in their individual capacities.

32. In order to ensure a satisfactory level of observation of the elections by the United Nations, it is important that the international community agree to provide a high number of international observers, Mozambique being a vast country, with elections scheduled to take place at about 8,000 polling stations connected in groups to 1,600 polling sites. This effort will be complemented by observers from the Mozambican political parties. In order to strengthen the capacity of these parties to participate in the observation efforts, a programme is being worked out to provide training and financial and logistical support.

E. Civic and voter education

33. The Chairman of the National Elections Commission stressed that in order for the elections to be successful, a strong civic and voter education campaign will have to be undertaken, as well as adequate monitoring of the elections, with representatives of all parties participating fully in the monitoring.

34. The National Elections Commission is in need of assistance to facilitate efficient communication, which will be critical during the elections. Radio and television spots were being utilized but radio reaches less than 30 per cent of the population. The Mission was informed that there were radio transmission problems. ONUMOZ has requested Japan, which had reached agreement with the Government of Mozambique to improve radio broadcasting facilities, to try to boost the transmission capability temporarily. Germany is providing a radio station to RENAMO.

35. As the view was expressed that the elections would not necessarily bring peace, the Mission believes that there is a need to include a component equating elections to peace in the civil education radio programmes.

36. The Mission stressed to all interlocutors that the goal of the peace process is to bring democracy, permanent peace, political stability, real freedom of the press and responsible Government to Mozambique.

F. Financing of the parties

37. RENAMO informed the Mission that it needed additional financial means to assist it in connection with the elections. The Mission was informed that not all pledges to the Trust Fund for Implementation of the General Peace Agreement in Mozambique (RENAMO Trust Fund) had been honoured. Of the US$ 14.6 million already pledged only $13.6 million had been received, all of which had been expended. RENAMO also indicated that the European Union had approved funds but that these had not yet been released because of procedural difficulties.

38. The 16 smaller political parties also stressed the need to receive adequate financial support in order to enable them to engage fully in the election process. The Mission has been informed that each of them have now received $50,000 as a first payment from the Trust Fund for the political parties.

G. Security problems in the country before, during and after the elections

39. The deterioration of the security situation throughout the country before, during and immediately after the elections raises serious concern. The Chairman of the National Elections Commission stressed that it was important that the electoral campaign be assured of security and freedom of movement throughout the country.

40. The country will be going into the elections without a fully constituted and properly equipped army. The police are weak, poorly trained and lack the right equipment. On the other hand, thousands of soldiers, whose only skill is the use of weapons, have been demobilized and are without alternative employment. Armed banditry is spreading, especially in the countryside, and the situation may become critical.

41. Under the Chissano-Dhlakama agreement of 3 September 1993, and in accordance with the main principles governing the general peace agreement, the parties agreed to request the United Nations to send a contingent of police, inter alia, to monitor all police activities in the country, to monitor respect for the rights and liberties of Mozambican citizens throughout the country, and to provide technical support to the National Commission for Police Affairs. By resolution 898 (1994), the Security Council authorized the establishment of a United Nations police component as an integral part of ONUMOZ.

42. The Mozambican police is not adequately equipped to deal with public security. There is further need for international assistance in the field of training and equipping of the Mozambican police.

43. Under the general peace agreement, private and irregular armed groups, which had been formed to fight alongside the government forces against RENAMO, should have been disarmed before the completion of the demobilization process. The Mission was informed that the process of the collection of their weapons is under way. RENAMO raised the question of the need to disband the armed militias before the elections.

H. Humanitarian and refugee issues

44. By Security Council resolution 797 (1992), the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination was transformed into the humanitarian component of ONUMOZ. Humanitarian needs of Mozambique for the period 1992 to 1994 have been estimated at $616 million. The Mission was informed that 87 per cent, or $536 million, of that amount had been made available through the generosity of the international community.

45. The Mission was informed that the humanitarian activities coordinated by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination in sectors such as health and agriculture are designed and implemented in a manner intended to cater to the needs of all beneficiary groups, including returnees, internally displaced persons and the demobilized. However, for the demobilized there have been additional and specific programmes designed to facilitate their reintegration into civilian society. These include the Reintegration Support Scheme, a programme for developing occupational skills, a provincial fund to provide small and medium-sized grants for the employment of demobilized soldiers and facilitate their participation in community-based economic activities, and career counselling and problem-solving services.

46. The Mission was also informed that in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance annexed to the general peace agreement, the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination has also sought to ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided to all who are in need, including those residing in RENAMO-controlled areas. One function of the Office has been to open up the country and currently 40 non-governmental organizations are working in ex-RENAMO areas where formerly only the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Programme operated.

47. The Mission was informed that some 342,000 refugees are still outside Mozambique and that the internally displaced persons who have yet to re-establish themselves in their home areas number 900,000. These facts, together with the continuation of drought conditions in significant areas of Mozambique, suggest that emergency humanitarian assistance will be needed beyond 1994.

48. The social and economic situation in Mozambique is very critical. Changes following in the wake of the peace process, including demobilization and the

return of refugees and displaced persons, are increasing social instability. The humanitarian assistance programmes are too limited to address the scope of the problem. In particular, the demobilized could become a source of social unrest for a long time to come. This issue must be carefully reviewed and ways of assisting the present and the new Government in addressing the problem beyond the boundaries of the humanitarian assistance component and the ONUMOZ mandate will have to be sought.

49. The Mission was informed that as a result of an accelerated repatriation of Mozambican refugees nearly 1.1 million refugees had returned by the end of July 1994. It is expected that a further 200,000 will return during September and October 1994, though this will be too late for them to be enfranchised. In June 1994, UNHCR requested, on a humanitarian basis, that the deadline for voter registration of returning refugees be exceptionally extended to as close as possible to the election dates.

I. Mine clearance

50. The Mission was informed that there are an estimated 1 million to 2 million mines in Mozambique, spread over some 9,000 areas. The Security Council has stressed in past resolutions the importance it attaches to progress in mine clearance and related training in Mozambique.

51. The Mission was briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Director of the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination, and other ONUMOZ personnel on the United Nations mine-clearance programme in Mozambique. The programme, which was initiated in 1993, comprises the following components: a National Mine Survey, clearance of mines from 2,000 kilometres of priority roads and the establishment of a Mine Clearance Training Centre. Activities carried out within these components are intended to contribute to the creation of a national mine-clearance capability. The $18.5 million cost of the mine-clearance programme is met from a specific allocation within the ONUMOZ budget ($11 million), and by contributions from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs Trust Fund for De-mining Activities ($7.5 million).

52. Substantial delays in the implementation of aspects of the mine-clearance programme, and the state of the programme generally, were a source of dismay to the Mission. While the National Mine Survey has been largely completed, there has been only limited progress in the clearing of priority roads, and the Mine-clearance Training Centre is still not fully operational. The Mission was especially concerned to learn during a visit to the Training Centre at Tete that the Centre was experiencing difficulty attracting Mozambican trainees. The lack of resources at the Centre, including such basics as a reliable water supply and medical support unit, was also a cause of concern.

53. An accelerated United Nations programme aimed at creating a domestic mine-clearance capability is now operational in Mozambique. It has the following specific objectives:

(a) Clearance of mines from the 2,000 kilometres of priority roads;

(b) Strengthening of the Mine-clearance Training Centre in order to train 450 Mozambican mine clearers to be deployed in 15 platoons by November 1994;

(c) Building of a supervisory and management structure to cover both field operations and middle management;

(d) Development of a mine survey capability and the training of Mozambican supervisors, instructors and staff for the Mine-clearance Training Centre.

54. The financing of the programme beyond November 1994 deserves serious consideration as the Government of Mozambique is unlikely to be in a position to finance the programme on a long-term basis.

55. A dispensation was being sought by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination from United Nations Headquarters to leave the mine-clearing equipment behind.

J. Requests for assistance

56. The Mission heard a variety of requests for assistance, which included the following:

(a) The Government would like additional support from the international community in providing the subsidies for the demobilized soldiers;

(b) The Government requested assistance from the international community to equip and train the new army, including with respect to logistics and rehabilitation centres;

(c) The Government requested assistance in the training and equipping of the police force;

(d) The National Elections Commission requested funding for the recruitment of voter registration brigades for deployment in ex-RENAMO areas; additional logistical support, for example, vehicles, aircraft and efficient means of communication throughout the country; assistance to provide civil and voter education; and tents for electoral observers.

K. The relationship between ONUMOZ and the Government

57. It was clear to the Mission that there was a certain amount of friction between the Government and ONUMOZ, essentially because of the complexity of the situation in Mozambique. It is in the interest of the parties to ensure that the credibility of ONUMOZ is preserved. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General is of the view that the situation of ONUMOZ benefited from the visit of the Mission.

58. ONUMOZ is pressing to realize the goals of completing its mandate in a timely manner and contributing to the achievement of a successful democratic process. Its energy has lent it a high profile and led to some resentment, to

which it should remain sensitive. With events moving rapidly, the Government has occasionally felt overlooked, unconsulted, and even blamed for delays. Overall, ONUMOZ maintains a good level of cooperation with all the parties, including the Government, but must remain sensitive to those perceptions. The situation appears to be under control.

L. ONUMOZ after the elections and beyond 15 November 1994

59. Some members of the Mission requested the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to look into the question of which ONUMOZ elements scheduled to be reduced in strength could be kept on until after the elections.

60. Given the manner in which political, security, election and humanitarian events are converging rapidly to a resolution, the Mission felt that ONUMOZ could play a larger, more visible security role in this final period, particularly on the election days. With the lingering tensions and the novelty of elections, every effort must be made to prevent problems. ONUMOZ must deploy its high visibility straight through the election days and, in part, beyond. The United Nations should also have a post-election presence, to be phased out according to the dictates of the near-term situation.

61. In the view of the Government, the United Nations needs to assist Mozambique through a transitional period with a view to its institutional framework becoming fully operational when ONUMOZ ends, so as to ensure that the local framework is capable of effective governance.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

62. The Mission formed a positive impression of the pace of the peace process. It maintains a cautious optimism about its prospects.

63. The Mission was satisfied with the pace of demobilization. It noted, however, difficulties relating to the formation of FADM. It emphasizes the importance of a complete transfer of all FAM matériel to FADM. The Mission notes the importance of international support for the reintegration programmes for demobilized soldiers. There are problems of resources, in connection with which the parties have appealed to the international community.

64. The Mission is encouraged by the commitment of the parties to hold the elections as scheduled.

65. The Mission believes every effort must be made to ensure the registration process reaches all Mozambicans throughout the country. All zones of the country must be completely open to all citizens in every phase of the electoral process. Training and logistical support will need to be increased to ensure an adequate number of electoral observers. Party observers will require technical assistance. Allegations of electoral irregularities must be submitted through formal channels and acted on expeditiously. There is a need for donor support to meet shortfalls in the electoral budget.

66. The Mission recommends that the Security Council reiterate its call on the parties to respect the results of the elections once declared free and fair by the international community. The Security Council could further encourage the parties to reach an understanding that will promote post-electoral stability and harmony and respect for the rules of democracy.

67. If there was one area of disappointment in an otherwise successful mission, it was that of mine clearance, which was late in starting and has made little progress. This must be rectified, with proper machinery put in place. There should be no attempt whatsoever to disrupt the programme, or to transfer existing resources to another operation. The Mission recommends that the mine-clearing equipment remain in the country.

68. The Mission recommends that the international community assist Mozambique with additional trainers for FADM.

69. The Mission recognizes that the political, social and economic future of the country is entirely dependent on the willingness of the Mozambicans themselves to complete the peace process successfully. At the same time, Mozambique is in dire need of the support of the international community as it continues implementation of the peace process.

70. The Mission was impressed by the dedication, energy and hard work of all the ONUMOZ personnel it encountered. The Mission expresses its thanks to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the excellent support given to it in its work.

ANNEX I

Visit of the Security Council to Mozambique
7-12 August 1994

PROGRAMME

Sunday, 7 August

1625 hrs	Arrival at Johannesburg
1700 hrs	Departure from Johannesburg for Maputo
1830 hrs	Arrival at Maputo airport: Mission met by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Monday, 8 August

0800 - 0845 hrs	Mission working breakfast
0900 - 1030 hrs	Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
1030 - 1145 hrs	International members of the Supervision and Monitoring Commission
1200 - 1300 hrs	Mr. Pascoal M. Mocumbi, Minister for Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
1315 - 1445 hrs	Lunch
1500 - 1600 hrs	Heads of government delegations to the peace commissions
1630 - 1730 hrs	Heads of RENAMO delegations to the peace commissions
1900 - 2130 hrs	Reception at Polana Hotel hosted by the Ambassador of Nigeria to Mozambique and Mrs. I. J. Udoyen

Tuesday, 9 August

0900 - 1015 hrs	President Chissano (President's office)
1030 - 1145 hrs	Mr. A. Dhlakama (residence of Mr. Dhlakama)
1200 - 1245 hrs	Mr. B. Mazula, Chairman of the National Elections Commission
1300 - 1345 hrs	Lunch

1500 hrs	Departure from Maputo airport for Matalene
1515 - 1545 hrs	Briefing and observation of voter registration at Matalene
1545 hrs	Departure from Matalene for Manhica
1600 - 1700 hrs	Briefing at Manhica FADM training centre
1700 hrs	Departure from Manhica for Maputo
1730 hrs	Arrival at Maputo
1800 hrs	Press briefing
1900 hrs	Reception hosted by Mr. Din Jianduo, Chargé d'affaires of the Embassy of China to Mozambique

Wednesday, 10 August

0800 - 0845 hrs	Breakfast with chief editors of the press
0900 - 1000 hrs	UNHCR and United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
1000 - 1130 hrs	International members of the peace commissions and ambassadors of Security Council member countries
1130 - 1300 hrs	National Police Affairs Commission, National Information Commission and National Commission for Territorial Administration
1315 - 1445 hrs	Lunch
1500 - 1600 hrs	Political party leaders
1615 - 1715 hrs	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior ONUMOZ staff
1730 - 1800 hrs	Meeting on mine clearance with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Director of the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
1900 - 2100 hrs	Reception hosted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Thursday, 11 August

A

0615 hrs	Departure from Maputo for Tete
0915 hrs	Arrival at Tete
0930 - 1030 hrs	Visit to the Mine-clearance Training Centre; briefing by the instructors
1040 hrs	Departure from Tete for Nhamacala
1140 hrs	Arrival at Nhamacala
1140 - 1220 hrs	Visit to the RENAMO assembly area of Nhamacala; observe demobilization
1220 hrs	Departure from Nhamacala for Chimoio
1310 hrs	Arrival at Chimoio
1320 - 1510 hrs	Briefing and lunch with Botswana battalion
1525 - 1615 hrs	Visit to Government assembly area of Chimoio; observe demobilization
1630 hrs	Departure from Chimoio for Maputo
1830 hrs	Arrival at Maputo
2130 hrs	Meeting between the Chairman, Mr. Al-Khussaibi, Mr. Olhaye and the ambassadors of Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Malawi, Nigeria, Switzerland, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the representative of OAU

B

0800 hrs	Departure from Maputo for Quelimane
1000 hrs	Arrival at Quelimane
1015 hrs	Departure from Quelimane
1050 hrs	Arrival at Mocuba
1100 - 1200 hrs	Briefing by the Brazilian contingent commander
1200 - 1300 hrs	Lunch with Brazilian contingent
1330 - 1420 hrs	Visit to Mocuba assembly areas and local ONUMOZ sections

1430 hrs	Departure from Mocuba for Quelimane
1505 hrs	Arrival at Quelimane
1515 hrs	Departure from Quelimane for Maputo
1715 hrs	Arrival at Maputo
Participants:	Mr. Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg Mr. Luciano Osorio Rosa Mr. Antonio Ferreira Rocha
	Brig. A. T. Scheffers, Deputy Force Commander Lt. Col. Alexandra de Mattos Borges Lins Cap. Marinho Pereira Resende Filho
	Mr. Pelucio Silva

Friday, 12 August

0845 - 1015 hrs	Ceremony for demobilization of President Chissano and other high-ranking Government officers (Estado Maior General)
1320 - 1420 hrs	Debriefing with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
1430 - 1500 hrs	Press conference
1515 hrs	Departure from Maputo for Johannesburg

Annex II

Participants in the meeting of the mission with the international members of the peace commissions and ambassadors of Security Council member countries

(Maputo, Wednesday, 10 August 1994)

SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER COUNTRIES (AMBASSADORS TO MOZAMBIQUE)

BRAZIL	Luciano Rosa
CHINA	Din Jianduo
NIGERIA	Isaiah Udoyen
RUSSIAN FEDERATION	Valeri Gamaioun
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	Dennis Jett

INTERNATIONAL MEMBERS OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONS

UNDP	Joana Merlin-Scholtes	(CORE)
OAU	Ahcene Fzeri	(CSC)
European Community	Alvaro Neves da Silva	(CORE)
BOTSWANA	M. P. Lesetedi	(CCF)
DENMARK	Stig Barlyng	(CORE)
EGYPT	Esmat Abdel Azeem	(CCF)
FRANCE	Francis Heude	(CSC, CCF, CORE, CCFADM)
GERMANY	Helmut Rau	(CSC, CCF, CORE)
ITALY	Manfredo Incisa Di Camerana	(CSC, CCF, CORE)
KENYA	Lt. Col. S. M. Chege	(CCF)
NETHERLANDS	Robert A. Vornis	(CORE)
NIGERIA	Isaiah J. Udoyen	(CCF)
NORWAY	Bjoerg Leite	(CORE)
PORTUGAL	Carlos Neves Ferreira	(CSC, CCF, CORE, CCFADM)
SOUTH AFRICA	John Sunde	(CORE)
SPAIN	Pablo Gomez Olea Bustinza	(CORE)
SWEDEN	Birgitta Johansson	(CORE)
SWITZERLAND	Conrad Marty	(CORE)
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	Richard Edis	(CSC, CCF, CORE, CCFADM)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	Dennis Jett	(CSC, CCF, CORE)
ZIMBABWE	John Mayowe	(CCF, CCFADM)

Annex III

LIST OF THE 18 REGISTERED POLITICAL PARTIES IN MOZAMBIQUE

FAP-FRENTE DE AÇÃO PATRIÓTICA
Raul da Conceição (Secretary-General)

FRELIMO-FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇAO DE MOÇAMBIQUE
Feliciano Gundana (Secretary-General)

FUMO/PCD-FRENTE UNIDA DE MOÇAMBIQUE/PARTIDO DA CONVERGÊNCIA DEMOCRÁTICA
Domingos Arouca (President)
José Manuel Samo Gudo (Secretary-General)

MONAMO/PMSD-MOVIMENTO NACIONALISTA MOÇAMBICANO/PARTIDO MOÇAMBICANO DA SOCIAL DEMOCRACIA
Maximo Dias (Secretary-General)

PACODE-PARTIDO DO CONGRESSO DEMOCRÁTICO
Vasco Mamboya (President)

PADEMO-PARTIDO DEMOCRATICO DE MOÇAMBIQUE
Wehia Ripua (President)

PALMO-PARTIDO LIBERAL E DEMOCRÁTICO DE MOÇAMBIQUE
Martins Luis Bilal (President)

PANADE-PARTIDO NACIONAL DEMOCRÁTICO
Jose Massinga (President)

PANAMO/CDR-PARTIDO NACIONAL DE MOÇAMBIQUE/CENTRO DE REFLEXÃO DEMOCRÁTICA
Marcos Juma (President)

PCN-PARTIDO DE CONVENÇÃO NACIONAL
Lutero Simango (Acting General Coordinator)

PIMO-PARTIDO INDEPENDENTE DE MOÇAMBIQUE
Ayacob Sibinde (President)

PPLM-PARTIDO DO PROGRESSO LIBERAL DE MOÇAMBIQUE
Neves P. Serrano (President)

PPPM-PARTIDO DO PROGRESSO DO POVO DE MOÇAMBIQUE
Padimbe Kamati (President)

PRD-PARTIDO RENOVADOR DEMOCRÁTICO
Maneca Daniel (President)

PT-PARTIDO TRABALHISTA
Miguel Mabote (President)

RENAMO-RESISTENCIA NACIONAL MOÇAMBICANA
Vicente Ululu (Secretary-General)

SOL-PARTIDO SOCIAL LIBERAL E DEMOCRÁTICO
Casimiro Nhamitambo (President)

UNAMO-UNIÃO NACIONAL MOÇAMBICANA
Carlos Reis (President)

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1010
29 August 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 29 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF HAITI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations presents his compliments to the President of the Security Council, and has the honour to inform him as follows.

On the evening of Sunday, 28 August 1994, Father Jean-Marie Vincent, a member of the Community of Priests at Montfortrain, was murdered at the entrance to the residence of the Congregation at Turgeau, Port-au-Prince. According to eyewitnesses, he was killed by several volleys from automatic weapons fired by armed men who were keeping watch opposite the entrance. Father Vincent was 49 years old.

Ordained in 1971, he was Executive Director of Cap Haïtien Diocese up until September 1991. A highly respected religious figure, he founded a very well regarded literacy programme and, until his murder, was head of the Haitian Foundation for Economic Development. Father Jean-Marie Vincent was a very close friend and colleague of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Twice in the past, he escaped assassination attempts: in 1986 when he was attacked by landowners at Jean-Rabel where he was working with peasants in the context of an agrarian reform programme, and in 1987 at Freycineau (90 kilometres north of Port-au-Prince), where he, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide and two other priests fell into an ambush.

The summary execution of Father Jean-Marie Vincent is the most recent in a campaign carried on by the military and their allies since the bloody coup d'état of 30 September 1991, which has claimed more than 5,000 victims. The aim is to silence the voices which continue to take a position in favour of democracy.

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide has strongly condemned the assassination of Father Jean-Marie Vincent, and has made the following statement:

"Jean-Marie Vincent dedicated his life to the people of our nation. He was a champion of democracy, self-determination and participation. The nation's will to attain democracy and justice forms part of the heritage left by him, Antoine Izmery, Guy Malary and all the others who have fallen. Their tragic deaths will not halt this important objective. Nor will they impede the nation's march towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis.

"The nation pays tribute to its heroes. May the long suffering of the people of Haiti and their peaceful resistance to repression and violence constitute their tribute to the struggle for democracy in the Americas."

The Permanent Representative of Haiti would appreciate it if the text of this note could be circulated as an official document of the Security Council under the item entitled "The question concerning Haiti".

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/1011
29 August 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 29 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter dated 18 August 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations contained in document S/1994/983, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 27 August 1994 addressed to you by Mr. Hamid Yusuf Hammadi, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 27 August 1994 from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I should like to refer to the letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran contained in document S/1994/983 and to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Iraq, affirming that the course it has constantly pursued is to build positive relations with States based on good neighbourliness, respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, unequivocally rejects the Iranian claims and allegations made. The Iranian national Majid Esfandiari has never entered Iraqi territory, and he is not in Iraq.

There can be no doubt that these Iranian claims and allegations are merely part and parcel of the Iranian Government's practice of projecting responsibility for its internal problems onto neighbouring countries.

(Signed) Hamid Yusuf HAMMADI
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1012
26 August 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION CONCERNING HAITI

1. The present document is the third report I am submitting to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 917 (1994).

2. During August 1994 the situation in Haiti deteriorated further. The country is under political blockade. It is economically paralysed. The population has been living there for months in the anxious expectation of a solution to the crisis.

3. On the night of 31 July 1994, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 940 (1994), a state of siege was decreed by the "acting President". It replaced the state of emergency which had been proclaimed on 3 June 1994. It might give the semblance of a legal foundation to new restrictions of public freedoms.

4. On 1 August 1994, the Minister of Justice called on the government commissioners to initiate prosecution of citizens who had called for revolt or foreign invasion. On 4 August 1994, the Minister of Justice announced that public action had been initiated "against Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Mr. Fritz Longchamp, guilty of the crime of high treason for having addressed to the United Nations ... letters which served as the basis for that Organization's resolution 940 (1994) ...".

5. On 1 August 1994 the Ministers of the Interior and Information addressed a warning to the local press, inviting it not to publish alarmist or tendentious news and not to make itself the instrument of foreign propaganda under penalty of temporary suspension. On 12 August 1994 the press was forbidden to publish without prior authorization information or statements issued by foreign embassies or their press services in Haiti.

6. Journalists, both Haitian and foreign, are under increased pressure and threat. On 31 July 1994, a United States television team was arrested for filming the airport zone, which had been declared a strategic zone. The team was expelled from Haiti on 4 August 1994. Two Haitian colleagues of the team were detained until 11 August 1994. A journalist from a local radio station who was sought by the military has been living under cover since 31 July 1994. On 8 August 1994 the "Arc-en Ciel" radio station had to stop transmitting as a result of threats issued by armed civilians. Two regional radio stations have been prohibited from broadcasting Voice of America information programmes.

7. Since the expulsion of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) on 13 July 1994, the United Nations has no first-hand information on the repression in Haiti. A group of Haitian civil rights protection organizations, the Plate-Forme des Droits Humains, has drawn up a partial account of the human rights violations committed in July. It has identified 41 cases of extrajudicial executions, 200 cases of arbitrary arrest, 76 cases of inhuman and degrading treatment and 150 cases of searches and various forms of intimidation. The rights of expression and association are being severely repressed, as is evidenced by the attempt on the life of former Senator Reynold Georges and the attacks against the residence of Senator Clark Parent and the headquarters of a political party favourable to the return of constitutional order.

8. The Haitian economy is on the verge of collapse. Since last month, the national currency has lost 40 per cent of its value. There is galloping inflation, and shortages are becoming more severe. The prices of staple food products have more than doubled. According to international economists, almost four fifths of the population are unemployed.

9. On the humanitarian level, international assistance is continuing under increasingly difficult conditions. Food aid is provided daily to 940,000 people. Programmes continue to be implemented in the fields of health, water, sanitary installations and agriculture. However, this assistance is encountering numerous obstacles. The local authorities do not issue, or delay the issuance of, the duty-free import authorizations required. For a long time, they blocked the most recent humanitarian delivery of fuel oil, as well as products imported by the United Nations such as medications or generators. They are also very reluctant to authorize the landing of humanitarian flights at Port-au-Prince. Lastly, the security of the local and international personnel remains an issue of great concern.

10. With respect to the application of the sanctions adopted by the Security Council against Haiti, a bilateral arrangement was concluded between the Dominican Republic and the United States of America on 2 August 1994. Under the terms of this agreement, the United States will provide the Dominican authorities with the equipment required to monitor the border with Haiti. The multinational observer mission will be composed of 88 civilian and military observers and a support group of some 50 people. It should be deployed in the Dominican Republic before the end of August.

11. Since the adoption of resolution 940 (1994), the army has been setting up volunteer militias. It is drilling them in the handling of weapons against the prospect of a possible "foreign invasion".

12. In my view, we must make a last attempt to implement resolution 940 (1994) peacefully. I assigned one of my colleagues to an exploratory mission in order to consider the possibility of sending to Haiti a high-level delegation which would hold discussions with the military authorities. Unfortunately, this mission has not attained its objectives. I will keep the Council informed of the continuation of my efforts.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1012*
26 August 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1013
30 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF GREECE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the letter addressed to you on 23 August 1994 by Dr. Alfred Serreqi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Albania (S/1994/985, annex), I wish to point out the following:

In its relations with Albania, Greece has pursued a policy of cooperation and good-neighbourliness based on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Greece has repeatedly stated her readiness to approach relations with Albania in a constructive way for the benefit of peace and stability in the broader region of the Balkans.

Witness to this policy is the vast programme of economic and humanitarian assistance extended over the last three years to Albania by Greece and its support for the process of reform and reconstruction in Albania, following its recent emergence from a long period of totalitarian rule. At this point, I would like to note that some 250,000-300,000 Albanians have illegally crossed the border and are working in Greece, regularly sending back considerable funds to the benefit of the Albanian economy.

With regard to the recent episode of the unauthorized flight of a crop-spraying plane over southern Albania, the Government of Greece unequivocally condemned all extremists and irresponsible acts by individuals, which run counter to the policy of Greece towards Albania. The pilot of the plane, a reservist officer who had been assigned to a non-combat unit, has been relieved of his duties and remains in custody. He is now facing the legal and administrative consequences of his actions.

However, this unfortunate incident can in no way be described as a "very grave and premeditated provocation against the sovereignty and integrity of the Albanian State", nor can it justify the discriminatory practices of the Albanian authorities against the Greek minority, five prominent members of which have been brought to trial on spurious and unfounded espionage charges, in total disrespect of their fundamental human rights. The modalities of their arrest and their detention, as well as the trial procedures, are in flagrant violation of internationally accepted standards of the administration of justice and of the right to a fair trial.

The persecution and harassment of the Greek minority, the curtailment of the educational, cultural and religious rights of its members, and the gross attempts of the Government of Albania to implicate Greece in the above-mentioned trial, are undermining the efforts of the Greek side to promote relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

Further to the letter of Foreign Minister Mr. Karolos Papoulias (S/1994/429) and my letter dated 26 April 1994 to the President of the Security Council, I should also like to repeat our concern about the real motives of Albanian unfounded charges against Greece, including allegations of anti-Albanian plots with other Balkan States.

In view of the above, the Government of Greece appeals once again to Albania to respect the principles of democracy and human rights, to exercise self-restraint and to cease its current policy of tension towards Greece, so that all bilateral problems can be solved in good faith and through dialogue.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adamantios Th. VASSILAKIS
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1014
30 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On the instructions of the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I bring the following to your attention.

The re-strangulation of Sarajevo intensifies and the situation grows more critical, while the call of President Alija Izetbegovic (27 July 1994) for an emergency session of the Security Council on this urgent issue remains unheeded. In particular, the humanitarian lifeline for Sarajevo, the "Blue Route", remains closed, and concurrently, air deliveries remain largely uncertain and ineffective owing to Serbian sniping.

This is a systematic attempt by the Karadzic forces to place Sarajevo at their exclusive mercy and to reassert the deadly stranglehold which had been loosened since the NATO ultimatum.

The Blue Route remains closed because of the decision of UNPROFOR to in fact shut it down. Was it necessary for UNPROFOR to shut down the Blue Route and become an unwitting tool in this reassertive Serb stranglehold?

The Blue Route that can be travelled in and out of Sarajevo is entirely within territory controlled by the Government and army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR has chosen to close its section of the route solely because Karadzic's forces (in their increasing belligerence, designed to amplify their rejection of the peace plan) had indicated that they would no longer tolerate the operation of the route, and that they were prepared to shell and strike at the route if it remained open. The section of the Blue Route that is now shut down is entirely within the "safe area" and "exclusion zone" of Sarajevo. Therefore, any attack by the Karadzic forces against the Blue Route would be in contravention to numerous Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 770 (1992), 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), as well as the NATO ultimatum. Instead, UNPROFOR has chosen to shut down the Blue Route and effectively achieve a result for the Karadzic Serbs that would otherwise trigger NATO air strikes.

Furthermore, attacks on UNPROFOR and the civilian population of Sarajevo by Karadzic's forces have intensified. The response of the UNPROFOR command to the renewed aggression has been to equivocate the actions of the victims with those of the aggressors; of the host sovereign State and Member of the United Nations with those of self-proclaimed ethnic warlords and fascists.

We must remind the UNPROFOR command of the moral and legal consequences of its attempts at equivocation, most specifically, its written message of 10 August 1994 threatening the sovereign Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Government and the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have the obligation and duty to defend all of its territory and citizens. This responsibility and right, of a sovereign nation, is ingrained in international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

Rather than threatening unwarranted action against the legitimate Government and army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR should use such NATO ultimatums to maintain the opening of the Blue Route (or to achieve the complete and final lifting of the siege of Sarajevo). It is indeed unfortunate and strange behaviour when UNPROFOR, on the one hand, menacingly exhibits its sword to the more vulnerable victims, those undertaking the defence of innocents, and the legitimate Government and United Nations Member State; while, on the other hand, it conspicuously sheathes its sword when facing challenges from those that not only seek to victimize a civilian population, but also obstruct the UNPROFOR mandate and threaten the lives of its personnel.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1015
31 August 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 31 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the text of a letter dated 30 August 1994 addressed to you by the Head of State and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, His Excellency Mr. Emomali Rukhmonov, regarding the action taken by the irreconcilable Tajik opposition and foreign mercenaries to escalate the armed conflict in Tajikistan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its attachment circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) L. KAYUMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 30 August 1994 from the Head of State, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan addressed to the President of the Security Council

In recent days, the intra-Tajik conflict has begun to acquire new features which bring with them a threat to peace and stability not only in Tajikistan but also in the larger region comprising Central Asia and the neighbouring States.

The irreconcilable armed opposition and its protectors, having embarked on the reckless course of escalating the armed conflict, are bringing about its internationalization, a development which poses a threat of the uncontrollable spread of the theatre of war throughout Central Asia and the neighbouring States. In this connection, we are seriously concerned at the massive participation in the military action on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan of mercenaries from Afghanistan, Algeria, the Sudan and a number of other States. The Government of Tajikistan possesses incontrovertible proof of this, including dozens of nationals of the above-mentioned States who have been detained in the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan or left on the field of battle. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan is far from believing that participation of nationals of the above-mentioned States and of so-called "non-governmental organizations" in the war against Tajikistan is endorsed by the Governments concerned. At the same time, in view of the growing danger of an uncontrollable widening of the conflict in the region, we urgently appeal to the Security Council and to the Governments of the States whose citizens are taking part in the war against the people of Tajikistan to take urgent and effective measures to prevent further flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan. Over a period of a year and a half, elements of the irreconcilable armed opposition have not for a day ceased to engage in armed provocations, acts of terrorism and subversive activities directed against the entire people, continuing to commit them even while the intra-Tajik talks on national reconciliation were under way. Having embarked on the course of internationalizing the intra-Tajik conflict, the opposition leaders have in recent days concentrated acute and broad-scale armed provocation against the Russian border troops protecting the border between the Republic of Tajikistan and the Commonwealth of Independent States in accordance with bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and Tajikistan and with the Declaration on Respect for the Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of the Borders of the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. As a result of these actions, carried out both directly in the territory of Tajikistan and from the territory of a neighbouring State, some of the Russian military personnel have been killed or wounded. To protect the State border, and also for purposes of self-defence, Russian and Tajik border guards have been compelled to take the necessary and appropriate measures.

The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan is convinced that a solution to the ongoing conflict can be achieved only by political means in the context of the intra-Tajik negotiations on national reconciliation.

Bearing in mind that the policy being pursued by the irreconcilable armed opposition of escalating and internationalizing the intra-Tajik conflict carries with it a threat to the peace and security not only of Tajikistan, but of the whole of Central Asia and other neighbouring States, I consider it advisable to draw the attention of the Security Council to this dangerous trend and to request the Council to take it into account in its consideration of the situation that has arisen in Tajikistan with a view to taking the necessary measures to prevent aggressive interference from outside in the internal affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan.

(Signed) Emomali RUKHMONOV
Head of State
Chairman of the Supreme Council
of the Republic of Tajikistan

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1016
31 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 30 August 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, stating that Ms. Rachel Aron has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, the above letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/1017
31 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 29 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letters of 3 September 1993 (S/26404), 11 January 1994 (S/1994/23) and 4 August 1994 (S/1994/929) to the President of the Security Council concerning the composition of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and to the President's replies thereto of the same dates (S/26405), (S/1994/24) and (S/1994/930).

Having completed the necessary consultations, I propose that Albania, Cuba, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Turkey and the United States of America be added to the list of Member States contributing to UNOMIG.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/1018
31 August 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 AUGUST 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 29 August 1994 (S/1994/1017) concerning the additions to the list of countries contributing troops to the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Yuliy M. VORONTSOV
President of the Security Council

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UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
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A/49/358
S/1994/1019
1 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 71 of the provisional agenda*
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 1 September 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the dangerous escalation of border incidents provoked by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 71 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/49/150.

Annex

Statement of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia issued on 31 August 1994

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out with grave concern the dangerous escalation of border incidents by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the area towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemns most energetically the grave and tragic incidents that took place on 20 and 29 August 1994 in which Yugoslav citizens Nebojsa Martinovic, from Pec, and Goran Stevanovic, from Leksovac, were killed.

On 29 August 1994, around 7.30 p.m., in the vicinity of the Presevo border crossing, 250 metres inside the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a border patrol of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia killed Goran Stevanovic. After the killing, the members of the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia entered the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and removed the body of the killed Stevanovic from the scene.

This was the second tragic incident in the last 10 days in which a Yugoslav citizen was killed. On 20 August 1994, in the Jazince border area, a Macedonian border patrol killed unarmed civilian Nebojsa Martinovic and wounded another civilian, although they offered no resistance.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs warns that the killing of unarmed civilians, citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by the members of the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia cannot be justified and that they constitute a dangerous escalation of the erroneous policy and a blow to the efforts aimed at normalizing relations.

By such dangerous border incidents and provocations, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is trying to draw the attention of the international public to the concocted danger from the north, in order to justify the presence of foreign troops in its territory and to extort the lifting of the arms embargo.

All the responsibility for the death of two and the wounding of one Yugoslav citizen is borne exclusively by the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Proceeding from its principled option for normalization of relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and re-establishing the disrupted flows, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia rightly expects the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to abandon its policy of provocation, take the necessary measures for preventing border incidents, ensure a normal border regime and punish those responsible for tragic consequences.